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Abstract—This paper considers the problem of communication
over a memoryless classical-quantum wiretap channel subject
to the constraint that the eavesdropper on the channel should
not be able to learn with high confidence whether the legitimate
parties are using the channel to communicate or not. Specifically,
the relative entropy between the output quantum states at the
eavesdropper when a codeword is transmitted and when no
input is provided must be sufficiently small. Extending earlier
works, this paper proves the “square-root law” for a broad
class of classical-quantum channels: the maximum amount of
information that can be reliably and covertly transmitted over
n uses of such a channel scales like
√
n. The scaling constant is
also determined.
I. INTRODUCTION
Covert communication [1], sometimes also called de-
niable communication [2], stealth [3], or communication
with low probability of detection [4]–[6], refers to secret-
communication scenarios where the legitimate parties must
keep the eavesdropper from discovering the fact that they are
using the channel to communicate.
Many recent works study covert communication using
information-theoretic methods. Korzhik et al. [7] and Bash
et al. [4] observe that the amount of information that can be
reliably and covertly communicated over an additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel scales like the square root
of the number of times the channel is used. A similar result has
been known in steganography as the “square-root law”; see [8]
and references therein. Che et al. [2] prove that the square-root
law can be achieved over the binary symmetric channel. They
also show that, in some regimes, this can be done without
employing a secret key. Wang et al. [5], [6] subsequently
prove both achievability (with secret key) and converse of
the square-root law for a broad class of discrete memoryless
channels (DMCs), and also derive the exact scaling constant
for DMCs as well as for AWGN channels. Bloch [1] studies
covert communication from a resolvability perspective and
derives, in addition to the scaling law of the throughput, the
minimum length of secret key that is required.
Covert communication over various types of quantum chan-
nels has also been studied. For example, Bash et al. [9]
study covert quantum optical communication. Sheikholeslami
et al. [10] prove the achievability part of the square-root law
for more general classical-quantum channels: the inputs of
such channels are drawn from sets of (classical) symbols, and
the outputs are quantum states. They leave the converse of the
square-root law for such channels open.
The current paper extends the work of [10] to determine the
optimal throughput for covert communication over a classical-
quantum channel up to the dominant term. Our main result,
Theorem 1, establishes the square-root law for a broad class
of classical-quantum channels, and also determines the scaling
constant. Theorem 1 can be seen as a counterpart in the
classical-quantum case of [6, Theorem 2], with one minor
generalization: [6] assumes that the eavesdropper observes
the same channel outputs as the intended receiver, while the
current paper assumes a wiretap channel structure, where the
received states at the intended receiver and the eavesdropper
may be different.
The main new technial ingredient in this paper is a converse
proof adapted from the classical one in [6].1 Our achievability
proof largely follows [10]. Whereas [10] considers channels
with only two distinct input symbols, we allow the input
alphabet to be any finite set, which does not add significant
complication to the problem. On the other hand, [10] also
derives a bound on the length of the secret key required for
covert communication, which is not done in the current paper.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. Section II
presents the channel model and the results. Section III proves
the main theorem; the converse proof is given completely,
while in the achievability proof we skip some less important
steps, as our techniques there are similar to those in [10]. We
conclude the paper with some remarks in Section IV.
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND RESULTS
Consider a classical-quantum wiretap channel whose input
alphabet is X = {0, . . . , k − 1}. When a symbol x ∈ X is
transmitted, the corresponding channel output at the intended
receiver is a quantum state, described by a density operator
σ(x) acting on some Hilbert space Y. The corresponding
channel output at the eavesdropper is another quantum state
ρ(x) on some other Hilbert space Z.2 We assume that both
1Both the current paper and [10] consider only classical-quantum channels,
for which entangled input states cannot be employed. Extending our converse
to purely quantum channels (which allow entangled input states) may not be
easy; see also Section IV.
2Once the two output states are given, their joint state on Y⊗Z is irrelevant
to the problem considered in this paper, hence we make no further assumption
on it. Note, however, that we do not assume that ρ(x) is a purification of σ(x),
so the two states need not have the same eigenvalues.
Y and Z have finite dimensions. The channel is assumed to
be memoryless, so when a codeword xn = (x1, . . . , xn) is
transmitted over n uses of the channel, the joint output states
at the intended receiver and at the eavesdropper are described
by the density operators σ(x1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ σ(xn) on Y⊗n and
ρ(x1)⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ(xn) on Z⊗n, respectively.
A deterministic channel code of blocklength3 n for the
message setM consists of an encoder f : M→ Xn,m 7→ xn,
and a decoding positive-operator valued measure (POVM) on
Y
⊗n; the outcome of the POVM is the decoded message.
A random code of blocklength n for M is described by a
probability distribution on all deterministic codes of block-
length n forM. The average probability of error of a random
code is the average probability that the output of the decoding
POVM differs from the transmitted message M , where M
is uniformly chosen from M, independently of the random
choice of codebook.
Let 0 be the “off” symbol in X , which the transmitter
always transmits when switched off. The covertness constraint
is that the state observed by the eavesdropper should look
sufficiently close to ρ(0)⊗n, which is the state it would observe
if the transmitter were switched off. Specifically, as in [6],
[10], our covertness constraint is expressed in terms of relative
entropy
D
(
ρn
∥∥ρ(0)⊗n ) ≤ δ (1)
for some positive δ. Here ρn denotes the joint output state
at the eavesdropper over n channel uses produced by the
randomly chosen code and the uniformly chosen message, and
the quantum relative entropy D(A‖B) is defined, for any two
density operators A and B acting on the same Hilbert space,
as
D(A‖B) =
{
tr [A logA−A logB] , supp(A) ⊆ supp(B),
∞, otherwise.
(2)
Obviously, if, for some x ∈ X , supp(ρ(x)) 6⊆ supp(ρ(0)), then
using x will result in the left-hand side of (1) being infinite,
and violating the covertness constraint for any δ. Hence, for
the purpose of the current work, we can discard all such input
symbols. This allows us to assume, for the rest of this paper,
that
supp(ρ(0)) = Z. (3)
We are interested in characterizing the maximum amount of
information that can be transmitted over a classical-quantum
channel such that (1) is satisfied, and that the probability of a
decoding error can be made arbitrarily small at sufficiently
large blocklengths. Like in the classical case [1], [6], this
quantity can scale with n in different ways. The key property
that distinguishes between these cases is whether ρ(0) can be
written as a mixture of {ρ(1), . . . , ρ(k − 1)} or not.
3We use the usual terminology “blocklength” to refer to the total number of
channel uses by a code. However, it should be kept in mind that, in the square-
root case, the code can only be used once, because repeated transmissions will
eventually be discovered by the eavesdropper.
A. Positive-Rate Case
The following proposition characterizes the maximum
achievable rate for covert communication over a classical-
quantum channel.
Proposition 1: The maximum rate at which information
can be transmitted over the given channel with average error
probability tending to zero as the blocklength tends to infinity
and subject to the covertness constraint (1), in nats per channel
use, is given by
max
P :
∑
x
P (x)ρ(x)=ρ(0)
χ(P ), (4)
where χ(P ) is the Holevo information over the channel to the
intended receiver [11]:
χ(P ) = H
(∑
x∈X
P (x)σ(x)
)
−
∑
x∈X
P (x)H (σ(x)) , (5)
with H(·) denoting the von Neumann entropy:
H(A) = −tr[A logA]. (6)
The proof of Proposition 1 is similar to the classical case
[6, Proposition 1] and is omitted.
Proposition 1 implies that a positive rate is achievable for
our task if, and only if, a distribution P on X exists that
satisfies the following conditions:∑
x
P (x)ρ(x) = ρ(0) (7a)
∃x ∈ supp(P ) : σ(x) 6= σ(0). (7b)
B. Square-Root Case
Now we assume that no P satisfying (7) can be found. In
addition, we assume that
supp (σ(x)) ⊆ supp (σ(0)) for all x ∈ X . (8)
This case is the main focus of the current paper. Let Kn(δ, ǫ)
denote the maximum number of nats that can be sent over n
uses of this wiretap channel, with average probability of error
at most ǫ, and satisfying the covertness constraint (1). Further
define
L , lim
ǫ↓0
lim inf
n→∞
Kn(δ, ǫ)√
nδ
. (9)
The main result of this paper is the following theorem, which
can be seen as a generalization of [6, Theorem 2].
Theorem 1: If no P satisfying (7) can be found, and if (8)
holds, then L is finite and is given by
L = max
P˜ : P˜ (0)=0
∑
x∈X P˜ (x)D (σ(x)‖ σ(0))√
1
2
η ( ρ˜‖ ρ(0))
, (10)
where ρ˜ is determined by P˜ via
ρ˜ ,
∑
x∈X
P˜ (x)ρ(x), (11)
and where, for density operators A and B,
η(A‖B) , tr
[∫ ∞
0
A(B + s)−1A(B + s)−1 ds
]
− 1. (12)
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section III.
C. Super-Square-Root Case
Finally consider the case where no P satisfying (7) can be
found, and where (8) does not hold. In this case, no positive
covert communication rate can be achieved, while L as defined
in (9) is infinite, hence the optimal throughput scales in a sub-
linear but super-square-root way with the blocklength n. We
do not further investigate this case in the current paper. The
corresponding classical case is discussed in [1, Appendix G].
III. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section we prove Theorem 1. We divide the proof
into the converse part and the achievability part.
A. Converse
Consider a random code that transmits Kn nats of informa-
tion over n uses of the given channel with error probability
not exceeding ǫn. Let P
n denote the distribution on n input
symbols induced by the random code and the uniformly drawn
message, and let σn denote the joint output state over n
channel uses at the intended receiver. By Fano’s inequality
and the data processing inequality, we have
Kn(1 − ǫn)− 1 ≤ χn(Pn), (13)
where χn(Pn) is the Holevo information over n uses of the
channel to the intended receiver, computed according to Pn.
Let Pi and σi denote the ith marginal distribution of P
n and
ith partial trace of σn, respectively. We have
χn(Pn) = H (σn)−
∑
xn∈X⊗n
Pn(xn)H
(
n⊗
i=1
σ(xi)
)
(14)
= H (σn)−
∑
xn∈X⊗n
Pn(xn)
n∑
i=1
H (σ(xi)) (15)
= H (σn)−
n∑
i=1
∑
xi∈X
Pi(xi)H (σ(xi)) (16)
≤
n∑
i=1
H (σi)−
n∑
i=1
∑
xi∈X
Pi(xi)H (σ(xi)) (17)
=
n∑
i=1
χ(Pi). (18)
Further, because Holevo information is concave in the input
distribution (a consequence of the concavity of the von Neu-
mann entropy), we can write
n∑
i=1
χ(Pi) ≤ nχ
(
P
)
, (19)
where P is the average input distribution
P ,
1
n
n∑
i=1
Pi. (20)
Combining (13), (18), and (19) we obtain
Kn(1− ǫn)− 1√
nδ
≤
√
n
δ
χ
(
P
)
. (21)
We next consider the covertness criterion. Let ρi denote the
ith partial trace of the joint output state ρn at the eavesdropper,
then
δ ≥ D (ρn ∥∥ρ(0)⊗n ) (22)
= tr
[
ρn log ρn − ρn log ρ(0)⊗n] (23)
= −H (ρn)− tr [ρn log ρ(0)⊗n] (24)
= −H (ρn)−
n∑
i=1
tr
[
ρn
(
I⊗(i−1) ⊗ log ρ(0)⊗ I⊗(n−i)
)]
(25)
= −H (ρn)−
n∑
i=1
tr [ρi log ρ(0)] (26)
≥ −
n∑
i=1
H (ρi)−
n∑
i=1
tr [ρi log ρ(0)] (27)
=
n∑
i=1
D (ρi ‖ρ(0)) (28)
≥ nD(ρ¯‖ρ(0)), (29)
where the last step follows from the convexity of relative
entropy. Here, ρ¯ denotes the average output state at the
eavesdropper
ρ¯ ,
1
n
n∑
i=1
ρi, (30)
which clearly can also be written as
ρ¯ =
∑
x
P (x)ρ(x). (31)
Combining (21), (29), and (31), and noting that ǫn must
tend to zero as n tends to infinity, we obtain the following:
L ≤ lim inf
n→∞
√
n
δ
χ(Pn) (32)
for some {Pn, n = 1, 2, . . .} subject to the condition that their
corresponding output states {ρn} at the eavesdropper must
satisfy
D (ρn‖ ρ(0)) ≤ δ
n
, n = 1, 2, . . . . (33)
Next note that (33) requires
lim
n→∞
ρn = ρ(0). (34)
Recall the assumption in Theorem 1 that no distribution P
satisfying (7) can be found. In this case, one can verify that
there is no loss of optimality in discarding all x such that
σ(x) = σ(0). After this is done, the only P on the remaining
input symbols that satisfies (7a) alone is P (0) = 1. Thus, to
satisfy (34), one needs
lim
n→∞
Pn(0) = 1. (35)
Let
αn , 1− Pn(0), (36)
let P˜n denote the distribution given by
P˜n(x) =
Pn(x)
αn
, x 6= 0, (37)
and let ρ˜n denote the state at the eavesdropper induced by P˜n.
Then
ρn = (1− αn)ρ(0) + αnρ˜n. (38)
With (38), we can fix ρ˜n and compute the first and second
derivatives of the left-hand side of (33) with respect to αn,
using, e.g., [12, Theorem 11.9] and [13, (7)]. At αn = 0,
the first derivative equals zero, and the second derivative
is η(ρ˜n‖ρ(0)), yielding (see Lemma 1 in the Appendix for
details)
D (ρn‖ ρ(0)) = α
2
n
2
η(ρ˜n‖ρ(0)) + o(α2n). (39)
Combined with (33), this implies
αn ≤
√
δ
n
· 1√
1
2η(ρ˜n‖ρ(0))
+ o(n−1/2). (40)
On the other hand, by computing the first derivative of the
Holevo information χ(Pn) with respect to αn (with P˜n fixed)
we have
χ(Pn) = αn
∑
x 6=0
P˜n(x)D (σ(x) ‖σ(0) ) + o(αn). (41)
Combining (32), (40), and (41), and recalling that αn must
tend to zero as n tends to infinity, prove the converse part of
Theorem 1.
B. Achievability
Our achievability proof is a slight generalization of that
in [10].
Let P˜ ∗ be the distribution that achieves the maximum
in (10), and let ρ˜∗ be its corresponding output state at the
eavesdropper. Choose the sequence αn, n = 1, 2, . . ., as
αn = (1− β)
√
δ
n
· 1√
1
2η(ρ˜
∗‖ρ(0))
, (42)
where β is any constant in (0, 1). For every n, let Pn be given
by
Pn(0) = 1− αn (43a)
Pn(x) = αnP˜
∗(x), x 6= 0. (43b)
We randomly generate a codebook (whose size we choose
later) by picking every input symbol in every codeword
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to
Pn. Using the same approximation as (39), we can check that,
for large enough n, our random codebook satisfies (1). Next,
by slightly modifying the proof techniques of [14], we obtain
a sufficient condition on the sizes of these codebooks for the
average probability of a decoding error to tend to zero as n
tends to infinity. This condition yields the lower bound
L ≥ sup
{
a
∣∣∣∣∣ limn→∞∑
xn
(
n∏
i=1
Pn(xi)
)
· tr
[
ρn(xn)
〈
ρ̂n(xn)− e
√
nδaρn > 0
〉]
= 1
}
, (44)
where
ρn(xn) = ρ(x1)⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ(xn) (45)
ρn =
∑
xn
(
n∏
i=1
Pn(xi)
)
ρn(xn) =
(∑
x
Pn(x)ρ(x)
)⊗n
;
(46)
ρ̂n(xn) is the “pinching” of ρn(xn) with respect to ρn as
defined in [15]; and 〈A > 0〉 denotes the projector onto
the subspace on which the eigenvalues of the operator A are
positive. In proving (44) we make two main modifications to
the original proof techniques of [14]. The first modification is
to normalize the throughput by
√
nδ instead of n. The second
modification is, instead of the optimal hypothesis test between
ρn(xn) and ρn, which corresponds to a projector of the form〈
ρn(xn)− e
√
nδaρn > 0
〉
,
we use a suboptimal test by replacing ρn(xn) with ρ̂n(xn) in
this projector. The details of the proof of (44) are omitted.
For any γ ∈ (0, 1), define the set
An(γ) , {xn |Qxn(x) ≥ (1− γ)Pn(x) for all x 6= 0} ,
(47)
where Qxn denotes the “type” of the vector x
n [16]. We shall
see that, as n tends to infinity, the probability that Xn ∈
An(γ) tends to one. To this end, fix any x 6= 0 with P˜ (x) > 0.
Using the Chernoff bound we obtain
Pr [QXn(x) < (1− γ)Pn(x)]
≤ exp
(
−γ
2
2
· nPn(x)
)
(48)
= exp
(
−γ
2(1 − β)
√
δP˜ ∗(x)√
2η(ρ˜∗‖ρ(0)) ·
√
n
)
, (49)
which tends to zero as n tends to infinity. For x 6= 0 and
P˜ (x) = 0, we always have
Pr [QXn(x) < (1− γ)Pn(x)] = 0. (50)
Using the union bound and the fact that X is finite, we then
obtain
lim
n→∞
Pr [Xn ∈ An] = 1. (51)
Next we return to (44). Using the method of [15, Theorem
2] we have the following: for any parameter s ∈ (0, 1),
tr
[
ρn(xn)
〈
ρ̂n(xn)− e
√
nδaρn > 0
〉]
≥ 1− (n+ 1)ke−ψn(s)+
√
nδas, (52)
where
ψn(s) , − log tr
[
ρn(xn)(ρn)
s
2 (ρn(xn))−s(ρn)
s
2
]
. (53)
Note that both ρn(xn) and ρn are product states, so
ψn(s) = −
n∑
i=1
log tr
[
ρ(xi)ρ
s
2
nρ(xi)
−sρ
s
2
n
]
(54)
= −n
∑
x
Qxn(x) log tr
[
ρ(x)ρ
s
2
nρ(x)
−sρ
s
2
n
]
. (55)
For every x, the logarithm term on the right-hand side of (55)
equals zero at s = 0, and its derivative is uniformly continuous
and equals −D (ρ(x)‖ρn) at s = 0 [10], [15]. Further note
that ρn → ρ(0) as n → ∞. Hence, for any θ ∈ (0, 1), there
exists some q > 0 such that, for all s ∈ (0, q), for large enough
n, and for every x 6= 0,
− log tr
[
ρ(x)ρ
s
2
nρ(x)
−sρ
s
2
n
]
≥ s(1− θ)D(ρ(x)‖ρ(0)), (56)
while
− log tr
[
ρ(0)ρ
s
2
nρ(0)
−sρ
s
2
n
]
≥ 0. (57)
Thus we have, for the above parameters,
ψn(s)
s
≥ (1− θ)n
∑
x 6=0
Qxn(x)D(ρ(x)‖ρ(0)). (58)
For every xn ∈ An, we further have
ψn(s)
s
≥ (1− θ)(1 − γ)n
∑
x 6=0
Pn(x)D(ρ(x)‖ρ(0)) (59)
= (1− θ)(1 − γ)αnn
∑
x 6=0
P˜ ∗(x)D(ρ(x)‖ρ(0)) (60)
= (1− θ)(1 − γ)(1− β)
√
nδ
·
∑
x 6=0 P˜
∗(x)D(ρ(x)‖ρ(0))√
1
2η(ρ˜
∗‖ρ(0))
(61)
=
√
nδ aˆ, (62)
where for the last step we defined
aˆ , (1− θ)(1− γ)(1− β)
∑
x 6=0 P˜
∗(x)D(ρ(x)‖ρ(0))√
1
2η(ρ˜
∗‖ρ(0))
. (63)
Plugging (62) into (52) we have that, for every xn ∈ An,
tr
[
ρn(xn)
〈
ρ̂n(xn)− e
√
nδaρn > 0
〉]
≥ 1− (n+ 1)ke−
√
nδ(aˆ−a)s. (64)
Recall that, as n tends to infinity, the probability thatXn ∈ An
tends to one. Thus for every a < aˆ,
lim
n→∞
∑
xn
(
n∏
i=1
Pn(xi)
)
· tr
[
ρn(xn)
〈
ρ̂n(xn)− e
√
nδaρn > 0
〉]
≥ lim
n→∞
Pr [Xn ∈ An] ·
(
1− (n+ 1)ke−
√
nδ(aˆ−a)s
)
(65)
= 1. (66)
Finally, since θ, γ, and β can all be chosen to be arbitrarily
small, (66) holds for all
a <
∑
x 6=0 P˜
∗(x)D(ρ(x)‖ρ(0))√
1
2η(ρ˜
∗‖ρ(0))
. (67)
Combining this fact with (44) proves the achievability part of
Theorem 1.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have seen that previous analysis of covert communica-
tion over classical channels can be combined with quantum
information theory to derive analogous results on classical-
quantum channels.
Our converse proof does not seem easily extendable to
covert communication of classical information over memo-
ryless quantum (not classical-quantum) channels, for which
it is known that entangled input states may result in “super
additivity” of Holevo information [17]. Determining whether
the square-root law also holds for quantum channels may be
an interesting problem for future work.
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APPENDIX
Lemma 1: Let A and B be density operators acting on the
same Hilbert space, then
lim
t↓0
D
(
tA+ (1− t)B
∥∥B)
t2
=
1
2
η(A‖B), (68)
where η(·‖·) is defined in (12).
Proof: We compute the first and second derivatives of the
function t 7→ D(tA+(1− t)B∥∥B), t ∈ [0, 1], at t = 0. Write
D
(
tA+ (1− t)B∥∥B)
= tr
[(
tA+ (1− t)B) log(tA+ (1− t)B)]
− tr [(tA+ (1− t)B) logB] . (69)
The term inside the first trace on the right-hand side of (69)
can be written as a matrix function f
(
tA+ (1− t)B), where
f(a) = a log a for a > 0, so its derivative with respect to t
can be computed using [12, Theorem 11.9]. The second term
on the right-hand side of (69) is linear in t. We hence obtain
d
dt
D
(
tA+ (1− t)B∥∥B)
= tr
[
(A−B) (log(tA+ (1− t)B)+ 1)]
− tr [(A−B) logB] (70)
= tr
[
(A−B) log((tA+ (1− t)B)]
− tr [(A−B) logB] . (71)
From (71) we immediately have
d
dt
D
(
tA+ (1− t)B∥∥B)∣∣∣∣
t=0
= 0. (72)
We continue from (71) to compute the second derivative.
Using [13, (7)] we have
d2
dt2
D
(
tA+ (1 − t)B∥∥B)∣∣∣∣
t=0
= tr
[
(A−B)
{
d
dt
log
(
(tA+ (1− t)B)∣∣∣∣
t=0
}]
(73)
= tr
[
(A−B)
∫ ∞
0
(B + s)−1(A−B)(B + s)−1 ds
]
(74)
= tr
[∫ ∞
0
A(B + s)−1A(B + s)−1 ds
]
− 1, (75)
where the last step follows by standard matrix manipulations
and by the fact∫ ∞
0
(B + s)−1B(B + s)−1 ds = I. (76)
Recalling (12), the right-hand side of (75) is η(A‖B). Hence
combining (72) and (75) completes the proof.
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